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BOOK REVIEW
What is moderate Islam? edited by Richard L. Benkin, Boulder, Rowman and
Littlefield, 2018, 252pp., $90 (Hardback), ISBN-13: 978-1498537414
Women in the crossfire: understanding and ending honor killing, by Richard
Paul Churchill, New York City, Oxford University Press, 2018, 352pp., $85 (Hardback),
ISBN 978-0190468569
From “moderate” pillar to “radical” post
Is the term, “moderate Islam,” an oxymoron? Is it only a way of congratulating or encouraging
Muslims for being like us—for sharing liberal humanist egalitarian values? Is the term, “mod-
erate Islam,” then, any more an oxymoron than “radical Islam” is a tautology—that is to say,
a formula for condemning Muslims who are not like us—whose values we find disagreeable?
Cautiously circling around that dilemma are the contributors to Richard L. Benkin’s edited
volume, What Is Moderate Islam? But such assiduous avoidance of unacknowledged funda-
mental definitional questions rarely wins admiration. As a result, the book consists of a series of
chapters that bounce readers back and forth between discussions of “pillars” of good, “moderate”
Islam, on the one hand, to the “posts” of bad, “radical” Islam, on the other. Not a word is written
to dispel the view that key terms of the collection—“moderate” and “radical”—are loaded from
the get-go. Maybe a volume admitting as much would fail to satisfy readers of its conceptual
decisions. But not even admitting the problem is unforgivable.
The result? Not much here is new. About bad, “radical” Islam, what don’t we already know?
What sort of Western reader will defend the laundry lists of assaults on the fundamentals of
liberal humane values represented in so-called belligerence, authoritarianism, violence, intoler-
ance, misogyny, and prudery? Benkin and company spend far too much time kicking in open
doors when we most need to be knocking on the barricaded doors of honest entry. How to
maneuver around Benkin’s question-begging discourse of “moderate” and “radical” will present
the main problems for this review. By contrast, the second book paired for review—Richard Paul
Churchill’s Women in the Crossfire—shows us an author brave enough innovatively hammer
away at precisely such a grim and forbidding subject—honor killing—without naively assuming
the virtue of our own values and the vice of the values of others. But does his enlightened project
succeed in more ways than Benkin’s benighted one?
Having said this, Benkin’s volume offers a good deal of valuable information, however
conceptually compromised. For instance, Umar Duad Khattak’s “Moderate Islam Is an Illusion
—at Least for Now” devotes over a page painstakingly itemizing eighteen or so “radical”
Muslim beliefs and practices, guaranteed to repel any non-jihadi reader. Whether this be the
determination to convert all non-Muslims, believing that only Muslims will live a blessed
afterlife, wallowing in a sense of paranoid victimhood, even while feeling flush with power, and
so on, the mind of a “radical” Muslim seems fevered in sickness (147–8). Similarly,
Kulbhushan Warikoo’s “Islamist Extremism: Threat to World Peace and Security” leads
a Cook’s Tour of nation by nation horrors of “radical” Islam. You want atrocities against
women, children or ethnic-religious minorities? (28). Then, Afghanistan is just the place for
you. Are textbooks for efficient Islamization your thing, or madrassas fitted out for mass brain-
washing young minds more to your taste? Then, by all means, plan to stop-over in Pakistan
(31). Or, if widespread, garden—variety human rights better suits your tastes, the whole of
Central Asia is ready for you to roam (43). Liberals who spout vacuities like “Islam is a religion
of peace” need to be reminded that Islam’s being a religion doesn’t inoculate it from evil-doing
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any more than our Crusader ancestors were certified virtuous because they were emissaries for
the Vicar of Christ.
And, whether headed abroad or staying at home, Daniel Pipes’ list of 90 odd questions listed
in his “Smoking out Islamists via Extreme Vetting” may yield unexpected results (15–20).
Wondering whether that suspicious swarthy neighbor in the next apartment is on the up-and-
up? Simply ask what he thinks of “polytheists,” or whether his woman has the right to dress
anyway she likes, say, exposing her hair, bared arms and legs, or if religion and the state should
be separate, or whether he’d let his kid go on an overnight trip with their school class, or should
his wife have equal rights in initiating a divorce, or what about “homosexuality,” or, whether
women should work outside the home and even occupy “high governmental office,” and so on?
Pipes is dead sure that by using his handy list of questions, one will be able to “smoke out”
whether that guy next door is an Islamist or, maybe … the local Chabadnick rebbe.
These unanticipated results from the extreme vetting Pipes aims solely at Muslims should
caution us about singling out Islam as “radical,” even in Benkin’s sense of the term. More is at
stake, at least since judging what is “radical” depends on how “radical” is defined and one’s
point of view. By that standard, other religions and ideological systems may be equally
“radical” as Islam. So, maybe it is time we stepped back a pace and recognized the entire
enterprise of “smoking out” people who are not like us—“radicals”—and celebrating those who
are like us—“moderates”—for what it is: arguably an exercise in identifying who our fellow
tribe members are or are not. It may not, however, tell us anything worth knowing about
Islam. I submit that if we want to do justice to the issues prompted by Benkin’s book, we need
to penetrate candidly to the heart of our assumptions about what it means to be “moderate” or
“radical” in interesting ways. If being “moderate,” only means being like us, and being “radical”
means not being like us, such an effort is unlikely to produce revelations. Benkin’s book fails
being “interesting” because it can largely be dismissed as an uncritical exercise in cultural
tribalism.
A real issue: Muslim monism versus Muslim diversity
Despite how tiresome Benkin’s way of addressing the “moderate”/”radical” issues can be, we
do learn more about the under-told story of monistic Islam. Whether these monistic trends are
“moderate” or “radical” is irrelevant. What is important are the respectively homogenizing
Saudi and Iranian campaigns now being promoted across the Muslim world. The insurgent
efforts of ISIS and Al Qaeda to bring all (mostly Sunni) Muslims under the caliphate’s black
flag also may be counted alongside analogous Saudi and Iranian state endeavors. The opposi-
tion of monistic/diverse Islam may then matter more, and be less ideologically loaded, than
Benkin’s obsession with the so-called “moderate”/“radical” binarism.
Benkin’s collection contains at least two instructive chapters on monistic “radical” threats to
the Islam of Pakistani Balochistan. These serve to celebrate real examples of Benkin’s “mod-
erate” Islam amid the bevy of chapters (discussed above) about “radical” Islam’s deplorables.
chapter 5, Meerain Baloch’s “An Islam That Rejects Islamists: The Case of Baloch” may be the
first exposure for many readers of an Islam palatable to a secular Western worldview. State and
religion are separate, as are social and personal domains. Balochs value minorities and seek to
protect them from predation by the mighty (98). A Baloch code of hospitality and their values
of trust, loyalty to one’s word make for a welcoming environment (101). Somehow or other,
and remarkably, the Baloch have devised social schemes to short-circuit revenge violence, as
well (100). What puts Islam on the spot is the fact that for the Balochs, Islam does not exhaust
the entirety of what it means to be a Baloch. Nor, however Muslim the Balochs, on the whole,
may be, Islam does not need to be acknowledged by non-Muslims as the principal, and
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certainly not established, religion of the Balochs. All this is worth knowing, but also needs to be
kept at least analytically separate from the “moderate”/”radical” question.
Also, worth knowing is that the Balochs may survive the Islamic monisms being rolled out
from Riyadh or Teheran, respectively, but that reputedly “moderate” Muslim states such as
Malaysia and Bangladesh seem to be falling gradually under their respective sway. The title of
Benkin’s chapter, “The Myth of Bangladesh as a Moderate Muslim Nation,” speaks for itself. With
a population half the size of the United States’ squeezed onto territory the size of the state of Iowa,
and a slowly encroaching Indian Ocean devouring its fragile coastal land, it is no wonder that
Bangladeshi jihadis have become a major export. A more complex, but likewise depressing story is
told by Sunil Kukreja’s, “Whither Moderate Islam: Malaysian Style.” There, a gradual and
relentless Wahhabi drive to shape Malaysian Islam according to its own image seems to be
winning the day (88). Despite an ebb and flow between deliberate policies to establish a moderate
Islam against counter-currents of Wahhabism, (65–6), a one-size-fits-all “exclusive brand of
Islam” seems to be slowly squeezing out other diverse indigenous forms of Islam (69). Greatly
complicating matters have been the government’s policies for deepening national integration,
employing an ideology of Malaysian “moderate” Islam, on the one side, and a popular wave of
pious sentiment for greater Islamization cresting, as it were, at the same time, on the other.
“Which way, Malays?” one is tempted to ask. Like so many other examples in the Muslim world,
Islam seems uneasily stumbling toward different kinds of futures—some of which secular
humanists will find palatable, others they will not. Against the polemic thrust of Benkin’s volume,
I would argue that it is a mistake to mire ourselves in the confusions of moderate versus radical
Islam. Instead, those seeking to understand the major macro-trends in the Muslim world should
focus more on understanding the reasons, causes and consequences of monistic efforts to unify
what had previously been diverse forms of Islam. What accounts for these efforts? What should
the reaction of the West be to them?
The dromedary in the room
Amidst all the many useful facts and trends Benkin’s people amass, they ignore the hulking
dromedary in the room—a “dromedary” of a conceptual or definitional question. This
demands knowing if the contributors of this volume understand the term, “moderate Islam,”
to be as much an oxymoron as “radical Islam” is a tautology. “Moderate” or “radical” are terms
heavily laden with—unacknowledged—assumptions and value-judgments. Dare they confess
whose convenience is being served by assuming untroubled applications of such terms like
“moderate” and “radical” with respect to Islam? Looking that dromedary straight in the eye,
I would ask whether Benkin and his contributing authors really mean that radicalization is
simply Islam come into its own—simply Islam taking off the gloves? Similarly, do they really
mean that “moderate” Islam is a way-station on the road to full secularization? Further, do
Benkin and company possibly believe there is some neutral way to make the case that so-called
“radical” Islam constitutes an illegitimate development of Islam? What do Benkin and his
collaborators finally really believe about so-called “religious” value systems? Are these bound to
be incompatible with any liberal democratic order? And, if so, what reasons do Benkin and
company have for seeming to assume that Islamic values are any less compatible with a secular,
liberal democratic order than say the Jewish values of large segments of the Israeli political
order, or the Christian Democratic values of Bavaria or Italy, or the aggressive Christian
nationalist political values in the U.S.? This is to say that Benkin and company need to do a lot
of explaining about their view of the compatibility of “religious” values across the board with
a secular democratic political order.
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Self-owning, other-owning: either or both?
Perhaps the biggest victim of Benkin’s failure to acknowledge the dromedary in the room is
our understanding of the opportunities that Islam may offer for understanding ourselves.
Pipes, for instance, implicitly indicts Islam as “radical” for restricting marriage of its women to
non-Muslim men, for requiring religious tax from non-Muslims living in Muslim lands or
forbidding other religions freedom to proselytize among Muslims. But looked at in other ways,
such an indictment of bad, radical Islam may prove to be superficial at best. Anthropologist
Talal Asad raises some critical questions about our own values by comparing them with the
different vision of human nature Islam represents. In this penetrating discussion of religious
notions such as blasphemy and secular critique, Asad calls attention to the Occidental pre-
eminence of the ideal of the “self-owning” individual. He does so explicitly by contrasting it
comparatively with Islam’s notion of self as belonging to another. In an analogous way,
anthropologist Louis Dumont has also puzzled over Islam’s sharing with the West the ideal
of equality, but without affirming individualism. Asad argues that at a fundamental level,
religion is not best conceived as Christian do—as “belief.” Rather, Muslims view “What
matters, finally, is belonging to a peculiar way of life in which the person does not own
himself.”1 For Muslims, the self, then, is conceived as belonging to Allah ultimately, and
proximately to the ummah, and to Islam as a collectivity.
Conceiving the human person as “belonging to another” generates an entirely different
morality from one dominated by the self-owning person. In that context of other-ownership,
for instance, a most grievous moral offense would be to alienate the Muslim from their living
relationships, to disrupt the networks of belonging that make whole the Muslim self. This is
why “seduction,” (or even perhaps with “persuasion” or proselytizing) becomes a serious
matter for Muslims. This may help explain Muslim opposition to the marriage of Muslim
women to non-Muslim men, or Muslim sensitivity to proselytizing by non-Muslims in Muslim
lands. Both would constitute attempts to weaken the community and the network of relations
sustaining it. “Beliefs,” strictly speaking, have little or nothing to do with these rules. It is the
act of “seduction” that matters.
Muslims conceive “seduction” as leading someone away from where they belong, from
their living relationships. Our sexual sense of seduction may be part of this, not because of
the sex, but because of the social alienation. And, the social alienation matters because it is
felt to threaten the sense of a person’s deepest self. Seduction amounts to something far
worse for the Muslim than taking possession of the body of another. In seducing someone,
the Muslim sees the very elemental loyalties and affections of another subjected to the will
of another.2 “To seduce,” in the sense salient for Muslims, says Asad, “is to incite someone
to open up his or her innermost self to images, sounds and words offered by the seducer
and to lead the seduced—complicit or unwitting—to an end first conceived by the former.”3
Seduction facilitates the ultimate act of personal derangement.
How the Muslim “other” helps us understand ourselves
I would submit that Asad’s observations are powerful because they avoid the trite claims
that the Muslims have it right (or wrong) and the West has it wrong (or right) about
“ownership” of the self. Rather, in bringing out the conception of a self as belonging to
a larger whole, Asad challenges us, “self-owning” Occidentals, to consider the vulnerabilities
of our own preferred view of human nature. Inevitably, the comparison raises the prospects
of there being unacknowledged strengths in a Muslim view of human being.
Of course, once we think about it for a while, we may recognize that the notion of self as
belonging to others is not necessarily utterly alien to the West. For example, is each partner in
a marriage self-owning—at least as equally self-owning as before being married? It is only the
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peculiar historical development of Western societies that has pushed the notion of a self as
belonging to another into the shadows as the image of the free-willed, inner-directed, self-
reliant, autonomous individual ascends into the light. In this way, Western civilization’s
ominous decision to opt for the ideal of self-owning individualism becomes salient by
pertinent comparison with Islam. It pushes us to question the strengths and vulnerabilities
of self-owning. The Muslim critique of “seduction” might, for instance, give Westerners pause
to ponder what we have lost in forsaking the ideal of belonging to another? What social costs
have even self-owning individuals incurred by being seduced in one way or another? Consider
the damage done to the integrity of the human person and our duties to others by, say, our
constant, everyday bombardment by seductive mass media advertising. Far from trivial, on the
Muslim view, the assault of advertising by its “hidden persuaders” constitutes a moral danger
to human freedom and dignity. Stealthily, mass media advertising steals the soul and its
affections, frames our relationships in potentially unhealthy ways, captures the knowing
mind and its attitudes, however much we may have become inured to it as just the price of
doing business. This then is only one example of how aspects of what Benkin and company call
“radical” Islam might actually be read otherwise as offering a way for Westerners to gain
critical purchase on values usually gone unexamined.
Robert Paul Churchill’s manual for moral revolution
Since the book being paired with Benkin’s treats honor killing—Robert Paul Churchill’s
extraordinary Women in the Crossfire: Understanding and Ending Honor Killing—readers
might begin to wonder about the longer polemic arc of my argument. It may be all very
well and good, some readers might think, that some “radical” Islamic values can alert Western
victims to the dangers lying in wait for them, say from the “hidden persuaders” of commercial
or political seduction. But just how does an Asad, or the present reviewer, propose to interpret
“radical” Islam’s practice of honor killing (HK, hereafter) analogously? I can see how inter-
preting aspects of “radical” Islam can help me see how commercial or political interests try to
commandeer my buying or voting mind by their seductive methods, and how that can derange
my relations with those with whom and to whom I may belong. But surely nothing analogous
can be said to accrue to our benefit from a moderate look at honor killing? After all,
“Extremism in the pursuit of virtue is no vice,” as Senator Barry Goldwater said years ago,
“And moderation in the pursuit of justice is no virtue.” Barry Goldwater obviously cannot
speak for Asad, but I cannot imagine any conditions under which readers would entertain
moderation in the interrogation of honor killing.
That may be the main reason I cannot think of another book that has moved me to such
sadness as Churchill’s. Without even putting faces on its victims, Churchill forces readers to
come to terms with the anguish and desperation of its women victims. They die lonely,
wretched, demeaning deaths by the thousands each year. A powerful witness to their plight,
Churchill’s achievement is great, especially considering subject matter that tries the human
spirit. In all honesty, nothing that Churchill could—or should—have done could change this.
The fact that honor killing has ever existed, and indeed continues to exist (at the rate of
20,000 per year) cannot but sicken us to mourn our hapless far-flung sisters. Yet, grief is only
part of the story. Not content to wallow in the glum facts of HK, Churchill’s initial chapters
parade an exhaustive array of ways to understand the occurrence and persistence of HK, while
the final chapters lay out an uplifting practical strategy for ending it. Indeed, the ultimate
purpose of Churchill’s writing this book is “moral revolution”—to bring on a radical trans-
formation that will effectively end HK. That motive drives the book forward from first page to
last.
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No honor killing without honor, and a fact-list
Conceptual rigor and clarity are conspicuous strengths of Churchill’s book. So too is the
exhaustive description of all aspects of HK that Churchill provides readers. Over the course of
twelve pages, Churchill delivers a detailed portrayal of every imaginable aspect of what honor
killing involves from the characteristics of victims or perpetrators to the characteristics of the
communities enabling this social practice (58–70). Beneath the blizzard of details a substratum
of “honor” keeps every detail in place. HKs are a particular species of killing, always bound up
with issues of honor. Not only that, HK carries on today, both persistent and resilient (11). As
such HKs are “social practices” that are “both dependent on and help to structure the larger
sociocultural life of” honor/shame cultures (hereafter HSC) (72). That’s quite a mouthful. But
what it means is that HK does not stand alone, but rather is meaningful only in terms of the
rules governing so-called HSCs. That embeddedness in a network of cultural and social
understandings explains for Churchill why HK cannot simply be outlawed or otherwise
extracted for the purpose of its elimination. Put otherwise, this is to say that honor itself is
a function of “how society regards one, not a matter of individual integrity.” Being “honored”
is all about what people think they know; about perception. Honor is a measure of one’s worth
in the eyes of others (78), and a matter of one’s social “survival” (81).
Now, as many problems as an HSC throws up, Churchill does not want to abolish honor/
shame behavior, nor to replace HSCS with our guilt/sin moral culture. The Alevis of Turkey
and the Tuaregs of North Africa abide by the rules of HSCs, but do not practice HK (271–6).
Churchill’s proposal to end the practice of HK pays respect to the antiquity and logical
integrity of the honor/shame system, but seeks instead to encourage its reform from within,
by relying on a society’s own notions of a greater or better sense of honor. Like many of us
chastened by the failures of social intervention, Churchill feels that even well-intentioned
tampering with the inner workings of another culture not only bespeaks hubris, but also
may court disaster for the society invaded. It is far easier to crash an alien moral system than to
supply a viable replacement. For Churchill, this means that those wanting to change societies
need to retain as much of the original as possible. One, therefore, ends HK, not by upsetting
the HSC tout court, but by revising its rules of honor. Honor itself is enlisted to reframe
situations (269). Somehow or other—and Churchill is as unclear about this as is an honor
theorist like Kwame Anthony Appiah—HK abolitionists must convince members of HSCs that
HK is not honorable.4 “Cognitive dissonance” should be induced by framing HK as a shameful
act for a “real man” to perform, however wayward the woman. Even though it seems to beg the
question, occasionally Churchill argues that reformers might argue that HK should be replaced
with a greater and better sense of honor because HK is “outdated” (264) and “archaic” (266).
Opposed to honor stands shame. To lose honor, to be shamed, is to be diminished, the
inverse of pride (82). Unlike guilt, shame cannot be relieved, say, by a device like “confession,”
atonement or forgiveness (83). Shame is socio-cultural filth. To be shamed is to be socially
polluted. As such, the only solution to loss of honor is “washing,” being cleansed of pollution
(83). Such “washing,” therefore, requires some overt action. The only way honor can be
restored, polluting shame washed away, is by an act by or sanctioned by the community to
effect such a restoration. HK is one of the ways the pollution of female transgression is purged,
or washed away, leaving the family implicated in the transgression scrubbed clean of shame.
So thoroughly embedded are the rules of honor/shame in the societies dominated by them
that even in an HK, all participants—the victim as well—recognize “honor” as the basis for
HK. HKs are fully deliberate and often performed in public. Focused as they are on the honor
of families, HSCs require that an intimate male family member, who is deeply engaged in
issues of family honor, do the deed. A brother, uncle, cousin, or father thus does the deed (18).
Indeed, doing HK is one of the deeds men consciously believe they must accept doing openly
to prove to the community that they are “real men,” responsible family members in charge of
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their women (27). HK is, therefore, not performed by a potential sexual partner of the victim,
but by someone otherwise a protector.
Nor should HKs be confused with garden-variety gender violence or “IPV”—“intimate
partner violence” (15). An HK is an “execution.” They are neither political killings, such as
assassinations, nor spontaneous crimes of passion (16–7). Unlike other cases of IPV or other
honor-oriented violence (HOV), the death of the victim is the intended outcome of the assault,
not some lesser act, such as enslavement or exile (16). To us, HKs may seem disproportionate
to the offense committed. This raises the question why, in HSCs, is death, with all its finality
and irreversibility, the just penalty for committing a possibly passing sexual transgression?
Why not exile, enslavement or some other lesser penalty? Moreover, why is even the “percep-
tion” of an offense by the woman in question sufficient to require HK’s performance (10)? The
answers to such questions always seem to come down to a realization of what one is tempted to
call the “brittleness” (144) or fragility of HSCs, with their fixed gender roles, strict in-group/
out-group designations, living in relatively harsh and unforgiving physical environments, and
so on. Societies on the edge, so to speak, however long-lived, simply have slimmer margins for
error. A woman dishonoring her family threatens to bring down the family. For the sake of the
survival of the family, she and the shame she has brought must be purged.
The micro-causes of HK: violence prone warriors and the honor of the female
body
While these make up an impressive list of necessary conditions for HK, their sufficiency remains
in considerable doubt. HSCs, such as the Alevis of Turkey and the Tuaregs of North Africa
seem to survive quite well without practicing HK. For the sufficient conditions for HK, we must
therefore look elsewhere. That is why Churchill moves quickly to identify potential underlying
psychological and sociological structures in chapters 4–6 sufficient to explain HK. Churchill
attacks this problem from two complementary strategic vantagepoints. From the “micro-„
level, then, what psychological causal structures select for HK (chapters 4 and 5)? And, from
the “macro-„ level, as well, what socio-cultural causes come into play to produce the social
practice of HK (chapter 6)?
In chapters 4 and 5, Churchill spells out what he believes is the intricate complex of
psychological beliefs about manliness and femininity that inform a culture of HK. Notably,
Churchill devotes what seems to this reviewer as an inordinate amount of attention to child-
rearing practices. His concern to identify the causes of the personality type likely to perpetrate
HK follows an at least (lower-case) freudian path. Practices like playfully fondling the genitals
of pre-pubescent boys by their amused nurse maids, aunts and grandmothers draws
Churchill’s attention (109–110). Or, his focus instead passes to the way circumcision becomes
rite of passage to manhood (122–6). But all this is in pursuit of the ways that HSCs
manufacture—Judith-Butler-like—a particular kind of masculine psyche (102). Churchill fit-
tingly describes this process in dire terms. “Parenting and socialization,” concludes Churchill,
“for some male children can be so unpredictably brutal and traumatic as to result in traumatic
bonding with their aggressors” (130). No wonder these youths turn into men who can murder
a female relative with impunity.
Churchill further argues that since killing is elemental in HK, everything begins with the
question of identifying the causes of the “violence prone personality” (VPP). The likely suspects
prone to violence in societies where HK exists are always males. Yet, the targets of male violence
vary with gender. In war, for instance, violence occurs between men. Why then do the VPP men
kill women, as in HK? Well, the mere fact that HK occurs—by definition—in so-called Honor
Shame Cultures (HSC) does not solve the problem. Churchill believes something about strong
male/female opposition in HSCs plays a role here (101). Since binarism divides men and women
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into different, incompatible roles, this would account for why men only do HK to women. Men
do not kill other men in HKs, nor women other women in HKs they might initiate. Binarism
against dictates that how women behave, or are perceived to behave, is seen as the responsibility
of men to enforce. While women may be the reservoirs or receptacles of the family’s honor, but
it is the manly men who are responsible for avenging, protecting, enforcing, etc. the honor of the
family. In HSCs male/female binarism features ways in which it can be determined who the “real
men” are. Consistent with binarism, HSCs feature a highly ramified notion of masculinity.
Salient among such polar notions of masculinity is what Churchill calls “warrior-masculinity”
(WM) (103). Now, in situations where VPP and WM coincide, the ideal of warrior masculinity
merges with personalities that are “violence prone.” And, when the issue of defending honor is
added to the mix, we have a potent combination that Churchill argues provides further
“necessary conditions” of the expectation of an “actual” killing (104).
But what of the opposite pole of the binary? Where then do the ways women are conceived
come in? How is it that they become victims of killings, and not their male co-transgressors?
Where do they figure in calculations of “honor”? In a nutshell, it is in the body of women that
the reservoir of the honor of the family resides (138). Individual women, one recalls from our
earlier discussion, are not self-owning but belong to others – in this case to the family.
Violations of her body—even suspicions of violation—pollute the entire family. Violations of
the woman thus bring devastating shame and dishonor on the entire family. Further, we also
know that women are believed to be sexually powerful, by nature. Thus, if something sexually
deviant or abusive (rape, infatuation, sexual arousal and so on) should occur, she is always
presumed to be at fault (168). Women are also believed to be natural temptresses, so powerful
that men are relatively powerless in their presence. Thus, when a woman is accused of sexual
misconduct, it is she, rather than her male partner, who bears the blame, who loses honor. But
dishonor does not end there with the individual woman. Since she is the reservoir of honor,
from which the family drinks, so to speak, her shame and dishonor pollute the entire family as
well. HK is the act by which the family blots out their shame and dishonor.
Therefore, unless the family reclaims its honor, and dispels any shame, it will not survive. It
will have lost all standing in the community. In cases of dishonor, the family turns to its
leaders—its warrior defenders, those charged with being the family’s “Ardent Avengers” of
shame and dishonor. The family, typically through the agency of these warrior masculine men,
assumes its role in blotting out the shame caused by a wayward wife. It falls to those chosen by
the family to “redress grievances” befalling the family, such as the case of one of their women
bringing shame on the family. This sets the stage for the VPP and WM to act against the
woman who has shamed the family. HK is the means by which these grievances are resolved.
Macro-development is micro-destiny
In chapter 6, Churchill tries to account for the way gross cultural determinants create
conditions favorable for the rise and maintenance of HK. Churchill’s cultural materialist
story says that unlike the psychological and emotional—“micro” (181)—perspectives inform-
ing chapters 4 and 5, the explanations of HK in chapter 6 are delivered from on high—from
the “macro” level (181) of millennia of cultural social evolution. HK supposedly evolved as
a slowly emerging social practice formed by the survival needs favored by particular social
structures in which it occurred. HK is thus a “unique form of gender violence” (10) that
“emerged over a long course of time,” (221) only under certain specific cultural conditions. It is
something that “must have” (215) passed through a longue durée of discernable stages of
“natural selection” on its way to becoming what it is today.
Churchill, accordingly, argues from tenets of “natural selection” (184) peculiar to “cultural
evolution” theory. These tenets include the limiting conditions set by their kinship organization,
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the physical ecology in which a human group finds itself, themode of production employed to cope
with and succeed in this environment, the scarcity of resources typical of a given ecological niche,
strategies for insuring legitimacy and safety of offspring, the need to avoid, as much as possible,
fatal outbreaks of violence that might consume the group, and so on. One way to insure the
cohesion and friendliness of group members, for instance, is by sticking together. Endogamy—
marrying within one’s group—is one way people stick together. Likewise, societies that are both
patrilineal and patrilocal believe such arrangements achieve closeness among members of the
society and at the same time minimize hostility. Like the ancient Hebrews claiming descent from
a common male ancestor like Abraham, all members of these patrilineal societies have a common
male ancestor. These are only some of the ways that human groups thrive and survive by
organizing themselves in ways that adapt to the conditions in which they find themselves.
Now, what confounds students of HK is that it occurs within these very societies organized
precisely along patrilocal, patrilineal and endogamous lines. Societies that seem consumed with
the need to maintain security and predictability generate a social practice—HK—of the most
threatening and notionally destabilizing kind. HK seems like a most non-adaptive practice. It
diminishes a particular family by subtracting from the family and entire group a valuable
female member of childbearing age. It further seems to offend the “one for all and all for one”
ethos of these types of societies by preying upon one of their own (206).
But, instead, Churchill claims it is precisely this essential element of common blood achieve-
ment and debt that lays the bases for a crisis situation. The transgression of one against the norms
of all is a transgression against all. A woman who transgresses against her marriage dishonors
herself and the entire group. That is why her offense is so great, and why her punishment must be
as great as well. And far from concluding that her elimination by HK be fatal to the group,
Churchill’s “cultural evolutionist” approach claims instead that it enhances the survival chances of
the group. HK is ultimately adaptive, despite its subtraction of a fruitfulmember of the group, since
it actually increases the esteem in which the HK family is held, and thus its value in the group at
large. The HK increases the value of each remaining child of marriageable age, because the family
will have demonstrated that its honor will not permit any sort of breach—even if the victim of the
HK has only been rumored to have been unfaithful (216f).
But many observers are confounded by the need to kill the supposedly wayward woman.
Why so extreme a measure against what, after all, only may be a suspected transgression? Why
murder one of your own valuable females, often of child-bearing age, simply because the
surrounding community might believe she has transgressed? The act of HK seems distinctly
dysfunctional and the punishment of it, disproportionate. Many other kinds of penalties and
punishments, short of death, are available. So, why choose killing? Why not return the
wayward wife to her own family, or enslave, exile, physically punish, isolate, or publicly
humiliate her—complete with a brazen scarlet letter “A”?
Churchill answers again in terms further spelling out the brutal of the logic of the honor/
shame system. If the wayward wife is not killed, she and her child will be “free riders”—thus
dishonoring the legitimate family collectively as cuckolds (218). The “natal family”—the
wayward wife and her lover—must, therefore, not be seen as profiting from their ill-gotten—
dishonorable – gains. In an endogamous patrilineal society, the male perpetrator could right-
fully claim the power of paternity, all the while the legitimate family bore the costs of raising
the child—the Cuckoo Effect. HK solves this crisis of family honor by effectively eliminating
the woman, and in the process destroying the natal family. This insures that no dishonor
should come to the legitimate family. This is why, as Churchill says, HK is advertised as
“honest signaling” (220). By contrast, the offending male is never killed, primarily because in
an endogamous, patrilocal and patrilineal society that would incite something far worse—
internecine warfare—what Churchill calls “costly signaling” (211f).
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Shedding the white man’s burden of saving brown women from brown men
Churchill badly wants to end HK. But he’s thankfully not ham-strung by liberal guilt. Somehow,
he developed immunity from charges of being just another “white man trying to save brown
women from brown men,” as Gayatri Spivak memorably put it.5 Nor is Churchill about to have
recourse in the pernicious ideologies that enabled occupation of the moral high-ground by
imperious Westerners. Whether this came as theories of “white man’s burden,” the “mission
civilsatrice,” Social Darwinist adaptability, Marxist liberation, Victorian humanist progressivism,
or crusading Christian missionary soteriology, Western moral reformers came well-equipped to
tell “them” how to behave. Churchill doesn’t do that. But readers also benefit from Churchill not
predictably dissolving into a puddle of liberal self-doubt. He badly wants to end HK.
Yes, we are all guilty of one sort of cultural transgression or another. But egregious as HK is,
it seems to exceed the limits of tolerance afforded by social difference. Churchill’s no New
England Congregational missionary prude demanding that Hawaiian women drape their
naked bodies in an enveloping Mumu. At least that’s an attitude that Churchill silently
assumes. Actually, it never crosses Churchill’s mind that some readers might tolerate HK.
Nor does one suspect Churchill himself of trying deviously to pardon the practice of HK by
attempts to comprehend it. Post-colonial literature sometimes defaults to actual defenses for
one or another questionable Muslim practices, such as some gender division of labor, regimes
of female modesty, wearing the hijab, and so on. But, even with the best of tolerant multi-
cultural intentions, few of these interpreters of Islamic social practices will go so far as to
justify, say, the all-enveloping burqa, or certainly, female genital mutilation.
Yet, some try—at least to rationalize the required wearing of the burqa. What I find
interesting about particular efforts at tolerance is how absurd—even making allowances for
cultural difference—they turn out to be. Consider Muslim post-colonialist feminist, Lila Abu-
Lughod’s reading of the burqa in Afghanistan. In her view, we should not judge the burqa out-
of-hand or harshly as Western feminists have been wont to do. For Abu-Lughod, the burqa is
part of the solution to female confinement, not part of the larger problem of Muslim gender
segregation. Enveloped by her burqa, an Afghani woman, for example, can venture forth into
the public, leave her home, shop in the markets, run a business, even visit relatives and friends
and so on. Safeguarded within her burqa, like some suburban soccer mom in her SUV high
about the raging traffic, an Afghani woman can move about her dangerous world without fear
of reproach or social penalty!6 Doubtless, what Abu-Lughod reports is true. But as intriguing
as Abu-Lughod’s reading may be, one is tempted to press the issue. Yes, the burqa might well
offer Afghani women some measure of control over their lives in public. But does one really
imagine that Afghani women are content with this arrangement, especially as they learn ever
more increasingly of the normal lives of other—even Muslim—women in other places? It is
hard to resist sarcasm by asking the question of what possible complaints be-burqa-ed Afghani
women could register since they can safely cruise about all be-burqua-ed? If our suburban
soccer moms don’t grumble about their SUVs, why should Afghani women whine about
needing to don a full-bore burqa just to step outside the house?
Churchill does not approach the degree of tolerance of HK that Abu-Lughod affords the
burqa. Nevertheless, he arms himself against charges of making excuses for HK because he
argues from the relativizing perspective of social evolution. True, Churchill’s evolutionism
relativizes a practice like HK by citing its functions for social survival within a particular
ecological niche and level of historical development. Killing kin within one’s own group is
generally proscribed, but HK is an exception to the rule, because in saving a family’s honor, it
functions to maintain a family’s survival. Killing other humans is likewise felt undesirable, but
in societies where honor and shame frame behavior, killing to preserve honor maybe
a necessity—however unfortunate. Churchill argues in somewhat the same way, namely that
HK should be grasped as a necessary Darwinian “adaptation,” and hence as something
10 BOOK REVIEW
necessary for survival of the social units practicing HK under certain conditions necessary for
survival at certain times and places. HK, thus, “functions” for the survival of a social group
only relative to specific historical stages of human cultural development and in particular
cultural ecologies and material environments. Churchill’s detailed discussion of these condi-
tions dominate his discussion of the macro-causes of HK.
Immoral and benighted
Despite the social functionality demonstrated for HK, not surprisingly, Churchill condemns
HK, even if his moral disapproval tends to get lost in his intricate argumentation. But moral
condemnation is there, nonetheless. From an absolute standpoint, that is to say, outside the
relative conditions of its “archaic and dysfunctional” home location, Churchill declares HK
plainly “immoral” (266). Quite simply, the existence of HK shows the extent to which “human
beings are benighted” (168).
While Churchill does not spell out the grounds for his moral judgment against HK, he at
least avoids defaulting to widely discredited ideological options. En route to the moral revolu-
tion that he hopes would put an end to HK, Churchill speaks in a nebulous global moral
language of undeclared provenance. In this, Churchill is in the excellent company of the
estimable Kwame Anthony Appiah and his splendid treatise on the honor/shame social system,
Honor Code.7 There, Appiah derails potential backdoor neo-imperialism by imagining moral
revolutions generated from within a given culture, and not imposed upon it from outside.
What Appiah (and Churchill) mean can be illustrated by the way nineteenth century Chinese
elites ceased the honor-bound custom of binding the feet of their women. They did not do so
because of moral condemnation by Western missionaries. But when they had embarked on
a campaign of gaining respect for China abroad, they found that they were ashamed to admit
foot-binding. Thus, for the sake of attaining new kinds and levels of honor, the Chinese
abandoned older methods on their own terms. Churchill’s “bottom-up transformative pro-
cesses” (282) are devised to do just that.
Churchill is in good company with post-colonial, multicultural demands for indigenous
moral and social reform like those advocated by anthropologist Amina Jamal and philosopher,
Kwame Anthony Appiah,8 Recently, Jamal argued that moral revolutions ought to be justified
from within a tradition or culture, not from without. Thus, in opposing such practices as HK,
one ought not to imagine that transformative change can only come from the defeat of
“barbaric” religions like Islam by the imperial forces of enlightened secular Occidental uni-
versalism. Many Muslim leaders have in fact spoken out already against HK as being un-
Islamic. Why might there not be other sources of opposition to HK, again, coming from within
Islam, such as the Muslim feminists inspired by a “transgressive piety,” mentioned by Jamal?9
Given that his program seeks to relieve women of horrors of HK without invoking familiar
tropes of imperialist moralism, Churchill’s moral ambition seems to escape the suspicion of
reflecting a narrow Western male gender bias. From the onset, he situates his quest for a moral
revolution against HK in the contemporary consensus of moral resistance to “gender violence”
of any kind whatsoever—again, of undeclared provenance.
Critique: development as destiny and the problem of “moderate” Islam
In the end, does Churchill’s cultural materialism adequately address the questions one might
have about HK? For instance, to Churchill, the rise and survival of HK seems to have little or
nothing to do with contemporary human life like political ideology or religion. HK is best
understood, he assumes, by attending to its development over a geologically lengthy period of
the evolution. With attention fixed on this long historical development, Churchill resists giving
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the contemporary religious politics of—especially—modern Muslim theocratic nation-states,
such as Iran, Pakistan, or Saudi Arabia much play in the HK of today. So, let me put some
questions to Churchill that challenge his view.
How do we know?
Churchill says that HK is both “outdated” (264) and “archaic” (266). But Churchill’s longue
durée evolutionary projections on the origins and nature of HK will draw fire from critics who
wonder how Churchill can be sure of the deep antiquity of HK. I put aside Churchill’s claim
that HK is “outdated,” because saying something is, in effect, “out of fashion” seems more an
understandable expression of disdain for HK. Fine. We all presumably share that view of the
arc of human morality. But adding HK’s being “outdated” doesn’t tell us much more about
Churchill’s thinking. At best, it is less a clear statement of fact than one of Churchill’s
evaluation of HK.
On the other hand, saying HK is “archaic,” and especially in the context of Churchill’s
evolutionism, sounds like a straightforward historical claim. HK is an old social practice, very
old. But how do we really know that it is very old, indeed, “archaic”? How, that is, do we know
of HK’s existence before the relatively recent existence of human records, that Churchill
himself cites? Ab origine is a long while gone. I do not see how Churchill’s theory of cultural
evolution is equipped to inform us about such remote pre-historic times. To root HK any
deeper than historical times, as Churchill has tried to do, would seem to call for evolutionary
theories with greater range than the one he’s supplied.
The urgency of now
The extent to which one finds the archaic character of HKs questionable, one naturally turns
inquiry in the direction of the role of contemporary events and structures. But Churchill doesn’t
do that. Although Churchill deals with the data of modern-day HK, as well as the psychological
formation of the personality types likely to perpetrate HK, he shies away from linking these data
to contemporary political situations that might have engendered them. Instead, what may seem as
undue attention as to childrearing practices dominates his account of the psychological causes
animating the HK perpetrators. Because he never considers the possible role of the agent
structures of modern theocratic Muslim nation-states, Churchill does not venture to say why
we should believe the modern political causes ought to be any less potent than child-rearing
practices or the ancient cultural formations that he cites. But I shall do so here. How, exactly, do
we know that HK today is not better explained as a modern revived social practice? How do we
know that modern structural demands, such as opposition to the West and its ethos of gender
equality, are not responsible for HK? How does Churchill, instead, know that the way young boys
are raised in societies practicing HK carries the greater weight of explanation he assigns it? How
can one justify ignoring the festering contemporary religious politics of modern Muslim theocratic
nation-states, such as Iran, Pakistan, or Saudi Arabia? About the effects of these explosive
emotional forces within modern theocratic Muslim nation-states for the emergence and suste-
nance of HK, Churchill is mute. This makes one wonder.
Perhaps with so much invested in showing how HK makes functional sense in HSCs,
dysfunctional present-day causes, such as male anxieties about losing control, do not get the
hearing they deserve? By relegating HK to a function within a specific bygone era, or to dwell
on the sexual nurture of young boys in HSCs, Churchill also avoids the inconvenient way long-
term dysfunctional social practices can persist in the short-term. One thinks of slavery in the
mid-nineteenth century antebellum American South as an instance of such a short-term
success masking its long-term doomed extinction at the hands of emergent agricultural
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technologies. One might then entertain the notion that HK was never quite as functional as
Churchill makes out, never as relatively adaptive as he argues? Maybe HK is more an
anthropological “survival,” clinging desperately to a narrow niche of viability, while the rest
of the world moves on?
You call this surviving?!
This is to argue that, considered as a presumed end-product of long cultural evolution, HK may
be a good deal less adaptive, less functional for social survival than Churchill would have it.
Stand back and look at the societies practicing HK, and that have presumably practiced HK for
centuries. Even granting Churchill the proposition that HK could be an ingredient in attaining
social stability, are not the societies practicing HK a pretty sorry lot? I accept that, as social
experiments, cross-civilizational comparisons are treacherous and hard to control. But, choos-
ing any measure of evaluating cultures, is Afghanistan more “successful” a society than
Switzerland, or Saudi Arabia more so than Taiwan, Iran more than the PRC, Malaysia more
than Singapore, or even Pakistan more than India? Would anyone be surprised if the
comparatively different statuses of women, generally inscribed into the Islam of these nations,
had anything to do with these differences?
Nature abhors the warrior-masculine man
Similarly, on the male side of the HK phenomenon, recent work by Richard O. Prum in the
biology of culture suggests that evolution does not select for the kinds of cultures practicing
HK.10 Unlike what evolution has conspicuously produced among our nearest biological
relatives, the great apes, human evolution selects against the survival of the type of warrior-
masculine, VPP (“violence-prone personality”) of the “Ardent Avenger” males who perform
HKs. Instead of selecting for the gender binarism typical of cultures practicing HK, human
evolution seems, as well, to be selecting for the lessening of the biological, and thus cultural,
differentiation of human males to females. Compared to the great gender disparity in physical
size and strength of the great apes, the ratio of such differences between human males and
females is far less. Unlike those cultures where the polarized male/female gender ideal persists
(Muslim cultures, par excellence), human evolution shows a distinct preference for cultures
where the roles of these lately-evolved, gentle men commonly overlap with those of women.
Evolution is selecting for human gender relations where tasks such as work, nurturing, food
acquisition and preparation, education and childrearing are shared between the sexes.11 So,
yes, HK may have been a factor in HK societies surviving, but the question Churchill needs to
answer is “surviving” in what broken—now “outdated”—condition, at what crippled state of
development—cultural, spiritual, esthetic, economic, political, social and so on? (216f). In
terms, then, of these comparative circumstances of survival, Churchill’s arguments for HK’s
fulfilling a function for survival might be regarded with a somewhat jaundiced eye. “Survival,”
how and what kind?
Islam in question
Refocusing on the present naturally brings in religion, particularly the modern Islamic
resurgence, so much the concern of Richard L. Benkin’s volume, What Is Moderate Islam?
Four specific questions come to mind in this connection.
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One
Churchill cites several Muslim authorities who tell us flat out that Islam could not have given
rise to HK because Muslim authoritative texts and traditions denounce HK. The Quran
nowhere sanctions HK, for example (30–1). But, does this argument suffice? It is unclear
why we should grant any more validity to such a disassociation than we would to a Christian
authority’s denying that the Crusades were “Christian” because they didn’t square with the
Sermon on the Mount. Are these repudiations of the Islamic character of HK, then, perhaps
only aspirational? Are they only statements of hope that HKs would cease being so frequent in
Muslim societies? Are they to be read any differently than similar denials of the actual history
of the Christian character to the Crusades? We won’t really know until someone decides to
research the question.
Two
As I noted earlier, Churchill argues that HK is not unique to the Muslim world. “Being
a member of the Muslim community is neither sufficient nor necessary condition for being
implicated in honor killing, either as a perpetrator, accomplice or supporter (29). HK is not
a „'Muslim problem’, “' Churchill says (29). HKs also occur in Christian lands, such as
Corsica, Greece, Sicily, Sardinia and Spain, as well as among the Druze, Hindus, Jews, Sikhs
and Yazidis (29). Yet, Churchill leaves this reader scratching his head, because he admits that
“there is a general association, or overlay, between the density of enclaves in which HSCs exist
and honor killings occur and global regions that are predominantly Muslim (31). HK thus
occurs across a defined swath of the earth’s mid-section among “certain tribal peoples of the
deserts and dry mountain uplands”—from Morocco along the length of Mediterranean North
Africa up through Asia Minor and across the Middle East to northern India (182). While this
territory maps well onto the range of the Dar-al-Islam, excluding Indonesia, Churchill claims
HK also occurs outside Muslim lands. Only the lack of good record-keeping prevents us from
determining the density of the occurrence of HK in Muslim sub-Saharan Africa, Myanmar, Sri
Lanka, Malaysia and the Balkans. I would note, however, that all of the non-Muslim places that
Churchill mentions where HK occurs—Corsica, Greece, Sicily, Sardinia and Spain—were, for
extensive periods at one time Muslim domains.
I think, however, that Churchill’s dismissal of a special relation between Islam and HK
betrays some weaknesses. Churchill arbitrarily confines the influence of a “religion,” like Islam,
to “religious observance or devotion.” At the same time, he refuses to assign—arbitrarily, it
seems to me—an Islamic description to other sorts of Muslim behavior. For instance, Churchill
fixes on a Muslim’s supporting the Shari’a as somehow not equally definitive of Muslim piety
as “religious observance or devotion” (29). Instead, he rules that this support of the Shari’a
really only reflects “preferences for religious authoritarianism, strict observance of rules, and
intolerance of both deviance and ambiguity”—as if, strangely, these were not also quintessen-
tially Islamic values, albeit legal ones, rather than doctrinal or ritual. Here might be a good
place to recall Asad’s analysis of Islam as a religion less defined by accentuating beliefs than of
fostering an umma to which the Muslim person can be said “to belong.”
Finally, as if trying to correct himself in making this dubious distinction between Islam as
belief and ritual practice over against Islam as “belonging” to the people of the Shari’a,
Churchill immediately adds that “at most, one might infer an association between some
forms of ultra-conservative Islam and such authoritarianism, strict observance of rules, and
intolerance, on the one hand, and support for honor killing, on the other” (29). But is this not
to declare that at least this so-called “ultra-conservative” form of Islam might be a necessarily
and/or sufficiently connected to the practice of HK? But, who decides what kind of term, this
“ultra-conservative” Islam is? Who decides what it means? Is it a tautology, as I argued
Benkin’s “radical Islam” might arguably be? Is “ultra-conservative” just “real” Islam, Islam
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with the gloves removed!? Does Islam itself tend, then, to be generally conservative—author-
itarian, strict, and intolerant—to such an extent as to render “ultra-conservative” tautologous?
And, if so, does this not replay all the conceptual difficulties plaguing Benkin’s What Is
Moderate Islam? If that, additionally, is so, Churchill, like Benkin and company, will need
frankly to address variations on the two questions that have haunted this review: Insofar as HK
is a practice associated with “ultra-conservative” Islam, does that fact affect the likelihood of
the term, “moderate Islam” remaining an oxymoron change?” Similarly, does that same fact
affect the likelihood of the term, “radical Islam” being a tautology, change as well? One might
raise the same questions about “ultra-conservative” Islam and cliterodectomy, the segregation
of the sexes, jihad, and a number of other practices for which “ultra-conservative” Islam seems
to have an elective affinity. True, these practices are not exclusive to Muslim societies in
general, but they are commonplace enough in the two increasingly influential monistic “ultra-
conservative” Muslim societies of Iran and Saudi Arabia to warrant respectfully posing some
frank questions. If doing so can provoke Islam and the West to begin frank and candid
attempts to understand each other, even the many false steps taken by those wedded to the
simplistic and question-begging discourse of “moderate” and “radical” Islam will have made
a solid contribution to the flourishing of the human species.
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